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ple can only be taken so far.
Campbell’s claim for Henderson’s significance in his introduction seems
almost unnecessary, and at times also off  the historiographical mark. He sees the
book challenging the “claim made by Canadian historians that being a maternal
feminist...involved the depoliticization of  women,” yet many feminist historians
recognize the deeply political nature of  maternal feminism – even if  they are
critical of  it. Similarly, to argue that Bettina Bradbury “shifted” feminist scholar-
ship away from Joan Sangster’s focus on “elite women” (4) to a new emphasis on
“ordinary women,” suggests political and scholarly differences between two
socialist-feminist historians which did not really exist. Campbell’s biography of
Henderson is so important, so very well done, that it needs little historigraphical
justification. Henderson was, on one hand, a unique, extraordinary, politically tal-
ented woman whose life is interesting in its own right. She was also a political
actor among others, part of  wider efforts to build resistance to capitalism, gen-
der oppression, and war. We are in great debt to Campbell for reconstructing an
extraordinary life neglected for too long.
Joan Sangster
Trent University
Marc Stein, Sexual Injust ice :  Supr eme Court  Deci si ons from Griswold t o
Roe (Chapel Hill, University of  North Carolina Press, 2010).
Clive Boutilier, a Canadian immigrant to the United States who had had homo-
sexual experiences, was refused naturalization in a 1967 Supreme Court decision,
Boutilier v. the Immigration and Naturalization Service on the basis of  a 1952 immigra-
tion law permitting exclusion of  those “‘afflicted with psychopathic personality’”
(61). He was deported to Canada in 1968 after being severely injured and perma-
nently disabled when a car struck him on a New York street in what may have
been a suicide attempt. Moved by this tragic and little known story, Marc Stein
has investigated the contradiction between Boutilier’s treatment and the powerful
narrative of  sexual liberalization that has dominated accounts of  five significant
U.S. Supreme Court decisions between 1965 and 1973, especially Griswold v.
Connecticut (birth control), Memoirs of  a Woman of  Pleasure [Fanny Hill] v.
Massachusetts (obscenity), Loving v. Virginia (interracial marriage), Eisenstadt v. Baird
(access to birth control for the unmarried), and Roe v. Wade (abortion). He argues
that the narrative of  liberalization ignores how the Court’s decisions upheld “a
legal regime of  heteronormative supremacy” (21) and liberalized only reproduc-
tive and marital, not broadly sexual, rights. Hence, the Lawrence v. Texas decision
of  2003 that invalidated sodomy laws was not a culmination but a reversal of
earlier views.
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This book is very clearly written and comprehensively researched,
addressing the above six Supreme Court decisions and dissents of  1965-73 in
detail and a few others more briefly: records of  justices’ internal discussions;
backgrounds, rhetoric, and reasoning of  lawyers making the cases; and responses
of  mainstream and gay and lesbian media, as well as of  lower court judges, to
the Court’s decisions. Some repetition occurs as we return to the cases in each of
the three parts of  the book, organized around the Court, the advocates, and the
media response. (An appendix with dates and basic details of  each important
case would have been helpful.) But this organization usefully articulates Stein’s
main points - that the actual texts of  the decisions were heteronormative, that
advocates also mostly failed to argue for universal sexual freedom and equality,
and that the media and often even lower court judges read the decisions selec-
tively as “liberal,” while “forgetting” both Boutilier and conservative elements of
other decisions.
Stein shows the texts of  decisions and justices’ discussions centred on
freedom and privacy for married couples while sustaining sexual regulation gen-
erally. Hence Griswold invalidated Connecticut’s anti-contraceptive law but also
noted the state’s right to prohibit adultery or homosexuality (30-32). Advocates
also used heteronormative language, did not challenge broader state controls,
and often resorted to the politics of  respectability, defending Boutilier and other
clients as decent, gender-appropriate, and citizen-like (20). Stein’s account often
has a critical edge, although he acknowledges that advocates sought to protect
individual clients by actually winning the cases and that their arguments were
limited by dominant heterosexual assumptions. More egalitarian discourses did
exist, but they were confined to minority libertarian, left, and homophile organi-
zations that lacked significant influence; lawyers feared using them would harm
their cases. Perhaps studying the court led him to overemphasize the cultural
power of  law vs. that of  the social and cultural environment. 
Most fascinating is Part III, where Stein demonstrates how different
popular conceptions of  the Court’s “liberalism” were from the actual, more con-
servative, texts of  the decisions. Not only mainstream but also the more critical
gay and lesbian media sometimes assumed rights to (marital) privacy or equal
protection (for the single and married) asserted in the “liberal” cases implied
rights for gay men and lesbians (228). More surprisingly, sometimes lower courts
also did, as in 1971, when “a federal judge in New York granted the naturaliza-
tion petition of  a Cuban-born homosexual, citing Griswold to support the claim
that ‘it is now established that official inquiry into a person’s private sexual habits
does violence to his constitutionally protected zone of  privacy’”(238). The nega-
tive import of  the Boutilier decision was forgotten because it disrupted this narra-
tive of  liberal progress.
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Stein attributes these “misreadings” to the desire of  some to promote
the sexual liberalization that they then read into the Supreme Court’s words. He
also notes what I think is a major reason – that “sex” remained so culturally
entwined with reproduction and marriage that decisions we see now as specifi-
cally heterosexual could be more easily read then as leading to a general “sexual
freedom.” We might see the Court’s heteronormative assertions as part of  a
defensive effort to preserve heterosexist structures then beginning to fracture.
Contradictions between the Court’s words and popular interpretations vividly
illustrate that “truth” is not singular; perhaps those who got it wrong in Stein’s
view are in the end at least equally right.
Sexual Injustice is extremely valuable. It reminds us of  the deeply-rooted
heteronormative thinking of  the Supreme Court, reveals the complexities of
legal change in relation to the wider society, and, not least, tells us the important
story of  Clive Boutilier.
Christina Simmons
University of  Windsor
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